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Survey1. Introduction
The damaging impacts of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse
gases (GHG) have been demonstrated in a number of studies (e.g.,
IPCC, 2014). Recognition of the need to stabilize the carbon content in
the atmosphere has been manifested in a number of international and
national agreements and policies, such as the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris
Agreement, and the EU climate policy. The main focus of these agree-
ments and policies is on reducing GHG emissions, but the carbon con-
tent in the atmosphere can also be offset by carbon sink enhancement.
Carbon sequestration occurs in above-ground growing biomass and in
below-ground soil from e.g., soil biomass and decomposition (e.g.,
IPPC, 2014). These two forest carbon pools are linked, as felling of
trees releases carbon to the soil and this is incorporated in successional
biomass production. Global carbon absorption in these two forest car-
bon pools in the period 2000–2007 amounted on average to 4.1 Pg C/
year (Pan et al., 2011). This corresponds to approximately 30% of the
emissions from fossil fuels in 2010 (IPCC, 2014). This absorption is
counteracted by the release of carbon in the soil by deforestation. The
global release from forest conversion amounts to approximately
2.8 Pg C/year (Pan et al., 2011).
Thus, the potential reduction in release of carbon from avoided de-
forestation and increased above-ground sequestration through forest
plantation and improved forest management can be signiﬁcant forabenezer.zeleke@slu.se
. This is an open access article underclimate policy. TheKyoto Protocol allows for carbon sequestration by af-
forestation and reforestation under the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) within the LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry)
activities, but this was limited to a small fraction of emissions in 1990.
More recently, the need for taking action against carbon releases from
forest was recognized in the Paris Agreement. In practice, carbon se-
questration has been introduced under different national regulations
on GHG emissions and voluntary systems (Peters-Stanley et al., 2012;
Kerr, 2013; Goldstein et al., 2014). Amajority of these carbon sink offset
projects have been incorporated in different voluntary systems, in par-
ticular under the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest
Degradation (REDD) program,whichwas created by the UnitedNations
in 2008 to enhance use of carbon sinks (UNFCCC, 2008). Despite these
efforts, in 2013 total carbon sequestration accounted for only 0.5% of
the total volume of carbon trade (Goldstein et al., 2014; Kossoy et al.,
2014).
The potential of carbon sequestration to help meet climate targets
depends not only on the size of carbon sink enhancement, but also on
the cost compared with that of other measures, in particular fossil fuel
reductions. The large body of literature calculating the cost of carbon se-
questration shows that the marginal costs of carbon sink enhancement
can be considerably lower than those of carbon emissions reduction
(see reviews by Sedjo et al., 1995; Stavins, 1999; Richards and Stokes,
2004; van Kooten et al., 2004, 2009; Manley et al., 2005; Phan et al.,
2014). Beneﬁts in terms of cost savings from introducing carbon sinks
into climate programs have been reported in studies on the cost of
meeting global or EU-level climate targets, which conclude that costs
can be reduced by up to 40% (e.g., Tavoni et al., 2007; Anger andthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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2012). However, whether these cost savings can be achieved depends
on the policy design. Examples of policies are carbon sink as offsetwith-
in a carbon emissions trading scheme or tax scheme, or compensation
payments for afforestation to enhance carbon sink. An important eco-
nomics question arising is how these policies can be designed so as to
foster changes in land users' behavior at minimum cost to society. This
study investigated the answers provided in the literature and how car-
bon exchange systems have been designed in practice.
Any type of policy targeting carbon sequestration has to deal with
speciﬁc design problems; heterogeneity, uncertainty, additionality,
and permanence. Heterogeneity refers to the fact that carbon sequestra-
tion of a certain area of land differs between regions because of differ-
ences in climate and geo-hydrological conditions, which means that
carbon sequestration per unit land depends on the location of the pro-
ject. This is in contrast to emissions from fossil fuel products, which
are quite similar per unit use of, e.g., gasoline. Uncertainty occurs be-
cause of stochastic weather conditions affecting biomass growth, and
from errors in monitoring and measuring sequestration (e.g.,
Houghton, 2005). Although there is some uncertainty in the conversion
of fossil fuel products to carbon dioxide equivalents, it is negligible com-
pared with that in carbon sequestration (Gren and Carlsson, 2013).
Additionality refers to the difﬁculty in assessing whether the project
would be implemented without the policy in question, e.g. whether a
piece of landwould be converted to forestwithout a compensation pay-
ment for carbon sequestration. Permanence in carbon sequestration
during the project period can be hampered by natural causes, such as
variations in temperature and precipitation, storms and wildﬁres, but
also by intentional violation of the project rules, e.g., harvesting before
the project period expires. Another aspect of permanence is the use of
harvestedwood products. Carbon sequestration lasts for a longer period
when forest products are used for building houses, rather than for
heating as bioenergy. These policy challenges for carbon sink projects
can be partly addressed by increasing the transaction costs through
monitoring and veriﬁcation of carbon sink enhancement projects (e.g.,
Cacho et al., 2013), but also through clever policy design, mitigating
high transaction costs.
The economics literature on policy design for forest carbon sink en-
hancement is relatively limited compared with that on the cost of car-
bon sequestration and cost savings from introduction of carbon sink
into climate policy programs, where there are a number of reviews con-
taining over 35 studies (van Kooten et al., 2004, 2009; Manley et al.,
2005; Sedjo and Sohngen, 2012; Phan et al., 2014). There are also re-
views on policies for carbon sequestration, but they focus on the struc-
turing of policy designwithout survey of studies (Angelsen, 2008), or on
speciﬁc forest carbon projects such as REDD+ (Hufty and Haakenstad,
2011), or a speciﬁc policy instrument such as contract design
(Fortmann et al., 2014), or only include a few studies (less than 10)
(Capon et al., 2010).
In our view, the main contribution of the present study is that it ex-
tends the existing survey literature on policy design. We focus on stud-
ies with the explicit aim of analyzing policies directed at improving
forest carbon sequestration. This excludes studies investigating side-ef-
fects of forestry and agricultural policies on carbon sequestration or re-
lease from soil, such as subsidies on bioenergy or taxes on emissions of
carbon dioxide (e.g., van Kooten et al., 1995). It also excludes studies
calculating the cost of carbon sequestration in terms of necessary com-
pensation to forest owners (e.g. Lubowski et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2014).
Studies considering uncertainty in carbon sink where policy makers al-
locate risk among different abatement and carbon sink options (e.g.,
Benitez et al., 2007; Fuss et al., 2013; Gren and Carlsson, 2013; Haim
et al., 2014) are also excluded, unless they contain explicit policy design
for carbon sinks.
When searching for studies with the explicit aim of analyzing poli-
cies for forest carbon sequestration, we used common search engines
such as Scopus, Thomsen Reuters Web of Science, and Google, andapplied key words such as ‘forest carbon sequestration’, ‘policy’, ‘policy
design’, ‘economics’, and ‘incentives’. In total, we found 45 studies
which address one of the key policy design challenges or describe
and/or evaluate carbon policies in practice. However,we cannot exclude
the possibility that we overlooked interesting and relevant studies, and
the review is thus not exhaustive.
The study is organized as follows. We start by presenting the litera-
turewithin economics addressing oneor several of different types of the
speciﬁc policy design problems with carbon sink enhancement. Next,
studies on carbon sink policies in practice are presented, followed by a
comparison and discussion of the main ﬁndings in the literature and
main design features in practice. The study ends with a brief summary
and concluding remarks.
2. Efﬁcient policy design
It can be argued that the policy design for mitigating emissions from
combustion of fossil fuel is relatively easy, since the effect on the content
of carbon in the atmosphere is the same irrespective of location of the
emissions sources. This is not the case with carbon sequestration. The
impact of carbon sequestration is site-speciﬁc and depends on factors
such as soil quality, tree species, and local climate (e.g., Houghton,
2005; Pan et al., 2011). A cost-effective policy design requires policies,
such as subsidies for afforestation, to take this heterogeneity into ac-
count and adjust to the site-speciﬁc sink enhancement. In principle,
this would not pose much of a challenge if the policy maker and agents
had information on carbon sequestration in each plot.
The complicating factors are associated with different types of un-
certainty in carbon sequestration, which can lie with the policy maker
and agents, or with asymmetric information, which lies with only one
party, usually the policy maker. One uncertainty common to both
parties is the variability in weather conditions which affects biomass
growth and thereby carbon sequestration in above-ground and below-
ground living biomass. Another is the uncertainty created by errors in
measuring, monitoring, and verifying carbon sequestration. A third un-
certainty factor relates to permanence in a created sink, which can be
turned into a source through natural events such as wildﬁres, storms,
and insect and pathogen outbreaks. Asymmetric information on, e.g.,
baseline emissions and costs of carbon sequestration, is a source of un-
certainty for the policymaker but not the agent, who implements a pro-
ject with full information. Another type of asymmetric information is
associatedwith intentional harvesting of planted trees before expiration
of the project period and with the absence of due care to avoid or miti-
gate carbon reversal from natural causes, which is known by the agent
but not the policy maker. These asymmetric allocations of uncertainty
between buyer and seller make it difﬁcult to ensure additionality and
permanence in carbon sink projects because of the need to measure
and establish a baseline and to monitor and verify the carbon sink en-
hancement by the project under a long period of time.
In the following, we review suggestions in the literature on policy
design for managing the challenges associated with heterogeneity and
uncertainty in carbon sequestration common to both parties in forest
carbon exchange, and asymmetric information with respect to forest
carbon cost and sequestration.
2.1. Heterogeneity and uncertainty in biomass sequestration
Instant uncertainty arises from the biological process of carbon se-
questration, which depends on stochastic weather conditions, and this
uncertainty is common to both the buyer and seller of carbon credits.
The literature dealing with this type of uncertainty can be classiﬁed
into two main categories. One category compares total abatement
costs under a system making carbon payments per ton forest carbon
with those of systems using other payment bases, such as unit area of
land or forest practice (Parks and Hardie, 1995; Kim and Langpap,
2014). The other category regards uncertainty as costly for society and
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uncertain carbon emissions reduction, where fossil fuel reduction is
regarded as relatively certain and carbon sequestration as uncertain
(Kim et al., 2008; Kim and McCarl, 2009; Gren et al., 2012; Munnich
Vass et al., 2013; Gren and Carlsson, 2013).
Empirical studies on efﬁciency losses in a uniform payment system
show differing results. Cost-effective allocation of carbon sequestration
requires the cost of a marginal increase in carbon sequestration to be
equal for all landowners. This condition is not fulﬁlled when land-
owners with different carbon sequestration rates per unit area of land
receive the same payment. Efﬁciency losses are then created from the
higher total cost of achieving a certain carbon sink enhancement com-
pared with a cost-effective solution. These losses can be relatively low,
as shown by Parks and Hardie (1995) for forests planted on marginal
agricultural land in the US. Using simulations, they calculate and com-
pare total sequestration obtained under a per ha and per ton carbon-
based policy for a given budget and demonstrate relatively small differ-
ence in total carbon sequestration between the policies; 10% higher car-
bon sequestration in the cost-effective policy with differentiated
payments. On the other hand, relatively large efﬁciency losses are re-
ported by Kim and Langpap (2014), who compare the costs of different
carbon sink policies for improved forest management practices (thin-
ning, fertilization, and ﬁre hazard reduction) in forests held by non-in-
dustrial private forest owners in the US. They develop an econometric
model to estimate the probability of adopting a certain forest practice,
which is used to simulate effects on carbon sequestration from car-
bon-based and practice-based incentive schemes. The results show
that, for a given total cost, annual carbon sequestration can increase be-
tween approximately 40% and 300% onmoving from a practice-based to
a carbon-based payment system. The variation is caused by the practice
chosen as a basis for payments.
With respect to uncertainty in carbon sink, the value of a unit uncer-
tain carbon sink is lower than that of a unit certain emissions reduction
when the policy maker is risk-averse. This risk discount is measured by
risk aversion and risk in carbon sink. Kim and McCarl (2009) measure
the risk discount by mean and standard deviation in carbon sink and
the buyers' risk attitude, expressed as acceptable conﬁdence interval
in sequestration. They point out that data on mean and variance can
be obtained from ﬁeld measurements, biophysical data, or by proxies
such as crop yield. In an application to the East Texas region in the US,
they show that the discount is about 20% of the carbon price at the
90% conﬁdence interval.
A similar approach is applied by Gren et al. (2012); Munnich Vass et
al. (2013), and Gren and Carlsson (2013), who calculate the optimal
discounting of stochastic forest carbon sink in the EU 2020 climate pol-
icy, which includes both a trading market for emissions reductions
(ETS) and national allocation plans. Gren et al. (2012) show that the
discounting of forest carbon sink on the ETSmarket is relatively low, ap-
proximately 5%. This is due to low supply of forest carbon credits on the
market because of themain use of the credits for reducing the relatively
high cost of fulﬁlling the national allocation plans. Munnich Vass et al.
(2013) examine the impact on equity from including uncertain carbon
sequestration in the EU climate policy and show that equity increases
when carbon sink is treated as uncertain instead of certain. The reason
is that the costs increase for the rich countries, which gain the most
from introduction of a low-cost carbon sink option under deterministic
conditions. Gren and Carlsson (2013) consider abatement of carbon
emissions from fossil fuel and forest carbon sinks as uncertain. Since
the uncertainty in fossil fuel abatement is lower than that of carbon
sinks, there is still a risk discount of carbon sinks, but it is lower than
when fossil fuel reduction is regarded as certain.
Kim et al. (2008) develop uncertainty discounting by adding a time
perspective. They investigate the impact of uncertainty in carbon se-
questration on carbon prices by comparing prices under risk-free condi-
tions with those under risky conditions. They calculate the discount by
equalizing the value of carbon offsets from a perfect offset, withoutany uncertainty, with that of forest carbon sequestration under risk.
The cost of a perfect offset is calculated as the discounted purchasing
costs of current and future offsets, where the time period is determined
by the contract length. The effective price is then deﬁned as the
discounted outlay divided by total amount of offsets. The effective
price for the impermanent project is calculated in a similar way, but
adds future costs in terms of buyback of offsets in the event of imperma-
nence before the contract expires, maintenance costs of carbon seques-
tration, and variation in carbon sequestration over time. The constant
permanence discount then increases in buyback, maintenance costs,
and growth rate in carbon prices.
2.2. Additionality
As mentioned in the introduction, problems with additionality arise
when projects fundedwith carbon credits would have been undertaken
without the credits. If carbon sink projects can be used as offsets by a
ﬁrm included in a compliancemarket, theﬁrm can buy a non-additional
carbon sink and reduce its own abatement. The overall abatement is
then decreased, but without a compensating increase in the carbon
sink. Thus, inability to separate additional from non-additional carbon
sinks may lead to higher costs and lower emissions reduction. Two
main approaches are suggested to manage this problem. One is to
make the individual carbon seller reveal their real cost of the carbon
project (MacKenzie et al., 2012; Mason and Plantinga, 2013;
Cordero-Salas et al., 2013; Delacote et al., 2014; Mason, 2015). The
other is to accept the asymmetric information and instead mitigate
the problems created by its existence (Murray et al., 2013; van
Benthem and Kerr, 2013; Bento et al., 2015). Common to both ap-
proaches is the assumption that the principal, i.e., the buyer of credits,
knows the distribution of business-as-usual (BAU) deforestation and
opportunity costs, but cannot identify those of an individual agent.
Under the ﬁrst approach, contracts are developed which give land-
ownerswith relatively low opportunity costs some extra compensation,
information rents, in order to accept a contract designed for them.
Mason andPlantinga (2013) compare the costs of such a contract design
for private forest landowners in the US with the costs under a unit sub-
sidy system. The results indicate that the total cost of the optimal con-
tract system would be half the cost of a unit subsidy for a given
increase in forest area. Instead of differences in opportunity costs be-
tween agents, Mason (2015) considers differences in agents' tolerance
of risk, where risk occurs in the opportunity cost of land from e.g., sto-
chastic output prices on forest products. Agents with relatively high
risk aversion and, hence, low risk tolerance, are likely to accept a
lower certain payment from a principal than less risk-averse agents.
Mason (2015) derives the optimal allocation of a ﬁxed transfer, which
can be regarded as an insurance, and a unit payment per area of forest
land set aside in order to make the agents reveal their risk preferences.
However, as considered by Cordero-Salas et al. (2013), a particular
landowner can sometimes face relatively high and other times relatively
low opportunity costs, depending on changes in product prices. They
show in a theoretical setting that a two-part tariff contract with a base
and performance payment is needed to make the agents reveal their
true opportunity costs in each period. The base payment corresponds
to the information rent needed for ensuring ﬁrst-best forest conserva-
tion of the low-cost type.
While most studies maximize net social welfare when identifying
optimal contracts, Delacote et al. (2014) investigate the consequences
of contract design and improved information on the agent's opportunity
cost when the principal has different decision rules. Given the multiple
aims of REDD to ensure carbon sequestration and alleviate poverty, the
principal can be guided by these concerns, or simply maximize their
own net income. Improved information for the proﬁt-maximizing prin-
cipal allows for less rent payments to the agent, but has no effect on
avoided deforestation. In contrast, a principal with environmental ob-
jectives uses the gains made from less payment to low-cost agents to
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estation area decreases. Effects on deforestation for a principal guided
by poverty alleviation are ambiguous, since they depend on the weight
assigned to different poor agents, but the income transfer to the poor
increases.
The second approach to non-additionality considers two sectors,
capped and uncapped, where the capped sector, which can be within
a carbon trading sector, can buy offsets from the uncapped sector as
compensation for its own emissions. In principle, upscaling of a capped
sector will result in equal or lower costs, since more low-cost options
become available. The risk of introducing non-additional projects that
would have been undertaken without the offset credit hampers the
cost-effectiveness of an enlarged capped sector. The literature suggests
and discusses seven main approaches to mitigate this threat;
additionality tests of offset credits, increased monitoring and veriﬁca-
tion, increasing the baseline scale of offset projects, lower emissions
baselines for the offset sector, more stringent emissions targets for the
capped sector, trading ratios between the capped and non-capped
emissions reductions, and a limit on the offset sector.
No study to date has analyzed and compared all these options, but all
studies include trading ratio between emissions reductions and carbon
sink as an option, i.e., that trading between the two options is made at a
certain trading ratio. A trading ratio higher than unity (i.e., more than
one unit of carbon offset for one unit emissions in the capped sector) re-
duces demand for offsets, which in turn decreases welfare for the
uncapped sector (Murray et al., 2013). This can alleviate non-
additionality, since ‘real’ projects will opt out because of the price de-
crease (van Bentham and Kerr, 2013). On the other hand, a trading
ratio below unity mitigates the problem of non-additionality, since
more ‘real’ projects will be supplied because of the price increase
(Bento et al., 2015). Increasing the abatement requirement for the
capped sector will raise its costs, but the net welfare of the uncapped
sector will increase because of the higher demand for offsets (Murray
et al., 2013; Bento et al., 2015). Increasing baseline emissions on a pro-
ject-by-project basis increases efﬁciency and transfers to sellers of off-
sets, since more projects opt in (van Bentham and Kerr, 2013).
However, this also implies that more non-additional offsets opt in
(van Bentham and Kerr, 2013; Bento et al., 2015). A limit on the amount
of offset credits has no effect on non-additional carbon sink, but raises
the cost of abatement and reduces the transfers to the non-capped sec-
tor (Bento et al., 2015).
Additionality tests can bemade by scrutinizing each project or by re-
lying on secondary data and common practices in the region and sector.
Murray et al. (2013) show that total abatement costs are lowest under
the project-based additionality test, but the transaction costs are high
because of the many small and spatially dispersed offset projects and
the existence of a ﬁxed cost component for trade with each project.
A key ﬁnding by van Benthem and Kerr (2013) is that it is almost al-
ways efﬁcient to scale up offset programs as an entity to a political juris-
diction at the regional or national scale with one emissions baseline.
Sellers then have to participate with all their forested land, instead of
only some with plot-speciﬁc baselines. This makes it more difﬁcult for
them to exercise their informational advantage. However, if a spatial
correlation exists between plotswhich jointly determine baseline emis-
sions among plots, these efﬁciency gains are reduced.
2.3. Permanence
Non-permanence arises from intentional felling of trees, e.g., to
make a proﬁt from selling timber, and from natural disturbances. In ad-
dition to market risks associated with carbon prices and opportunity
costs of land, compliance failures of partners, and political risks, there
are speciﬁc natural risks associated with carbon sequestration (e.g.,
Dutschke and Angelsen, 2008; Cooley et al., 2012). Cooley et al. (2012)
make a profound investigation of the measurement of these carbon re-
versal risks and point out the importance of spatial correlation in risksamong projects. Such correlation may exist among projects in a similar
ecological zone, where a ﬁre event can spread to neighboring parcels
and affect a large part of the forest area and number of nearby projects.
Correlation can also exist between events, such as insect outbreaks and
wildﬁre, depending on temperature. When these risks are negatively or
positively correlated, the total risk of the program decreases or in-
creases, respectively. Fire risks can be reduced by forest management
practices such as mechanical thinning and controlled burns, which can
be promoted by carbon credits (e.g., Daigneault et al., 2010). However,
the speciﬁc policy design problem arises from the buyers' difﬁculty in
observing the agents' management and protective measures against
risk of carbon reversals and the associated risk of moral hazard.
Dutschke andAngelsen (2008) and Palmer (2011) provide a number
of suggestions on how to deal with carbon reversal within the REDD
framework. Currently, Annex I countries purchasing REDD credits are li-
able for the release of carbon in violation of the contract (UNFCCC,
2005). Liability in cases of carbon release can be shared between host
and buyer governments, as suggested by Eliasch (2008), or in a bilateral
project-based setting. Palmer (2011) discusses pros and cons of liability
at the government or individual level in the host country, and empha-
sizes the need for deﬁning carbon property rights. In addition to liability
management, Dutschke and Angelsen (2008) present and discuss ad-
vantages and disadvantages of several optionswhich include temporary
credits, credit buffers, pooling of reversal risks, and commercial insur-
ances. However, neither Dutschke and Angelsen (2008) nor Palmer
(2011) provide in-depth analysis of efﬁcient design of suggested
policies.
Economics studies analyzing the properties of policies mitigating
non-permanence can be classiﬁed into two categories; contract design
under moral hazard for promoting due care of the forest (Gulati and
Vercammen, 2005; Cordero-Salas and Roe, 2012; MacKenzie et al.,
2012; Cordero-Salas et al., 2013; Pana and Gheyssens, 2015; Veronesi
et al., 2015; Engel et al., 2015) and duration of the credits (Feng et al.,
2002; Olschewski et al., 2005; Maréchal and Hecq, 2006; van Kooten,
2008). The studies on contract design investigate how to allocate a
ﬁxed initial payment and a performance payment, which depends on
discounted current and future net beneﬁts for entering the contract
and alternatives for both parties. This is made under different assump-
tions on principal behavior (Cordero-Salas and Roe, 2012), liability allo-
cation between buyer and seller (MacKenzie et al., 2012), choice of
emissions baseline (Pana and Gheyssens, 2015), and existence of uncer-
tainty in future net beneﬁts (Engel et al., 2015).
Cordero-Salas and Roe (2012) show that the optimal contract de-
sign, a close to zero ﬁxed payment and almost all upon delivery, is the
same irrespective of whether the principal is altruistic or not. In both
cases, relatively high opportunity cost for the agent requires relatively
high net future value for sustainable cooperation. The necessary
discounted net beneﬁts for sustaining cooperation are reduced when
the principal is altruistic, since he/she puts a weight on the agent's
wellbeing. This can be of speciﬁc relevance for REDD projects, which
usually aim at achieving poverty reduction in addition to carbon sink
enhancement.
In principle, there are three types of liability regimes; the principal,
the agent, or nobody is responsible for the carbon sink reversal.
MacKenzie et al. (2012) show that a switch from a practice of buyer to
seller liabilitywould improve enforcement of the contract and hence in-
crease investment in carbon sink. Investment may also be higher under
no liability compared with buyer liability, since the buyer does not have
to pay any penalty for carbon releases. On the other hand, the carbon
sink may be lower, since nobody is held responsible for its realization
and associated creation of incentives.
With respect to the role of baseline, Pana andGheyssens (2015) note
that the practice so far for REDDprojects has been to use historical infor-
mation, such as average deforestation,which has the advantage of being
transparent. They suggest and analyze this system with three alterna-
tives; model-based projection of BAU in the absence of REDD, a ﬁxed
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of historical averages. The ‘corridor’ sets payments that depend on dis-
tance from the lower bound of deforestation; the closer to the upper
bound (above which there is no payment) the lower the payment,
and the payment is zero when the upper bound is reached. The system
has the advantage of accounting for ﬂuctuations in the opportunity cost
of keeping forest caused by e.g., changes in market prices and weather
conditions. They also show that a modest upward-biased increase in
the corridor band width increases efﬁciency, but not a symmetrical or
downward-biased increase. The reason is that the upward-biased in-
crease gives higher incentives to stay in the program, thereby avoiding
deforestation.
However, permanence is not only uncertain because of climate
events, but also because of the opportunity cost of land. Prices of agricul-
tural commodity crops are volatile, which makes the net beneﬁts from
conversion of forest uncertain. Engel et al. (2015) investigate the pay-
ment needed for ensuring permanence in forest cover with a minimum
probability when the variable part of payment is indexed on either car-
bon prices or agricultural commodity prices. The former means that
payments vary with carbon prices and the latter that payments vary
with the opportunity cost of land. They show that payments are low
for a high correlation between carbon prices and opportunity costs,
since the price of carbon and the opportunity cost are then high or
low at the same time. On theother hand, the payments for ensuringper-
manence are high when there is large relative volatility in the indexed
component. Similarly to Mason (2015), they also show that increases
in the ﬁxed payment reduce total payment cost for ensuring perma-
nence, since this reduces total risk for the landowner.
The studies on temporary credits approach the permanence prob-
lem by investigating how to value and compare temporary and perma-
nent offsets (McCarl and Schneider, 2000; Marland et al., 2001;
Olschewski et al., 2005; Maréchal and Hecq, 2006; van Kooten, 2008)
or how to optimally design policies over time (Feng et al., 2002; Gulati
and Vercammen, 2005). As suggested by McCarl and Schneider
(2000); Marland et al. (2001), and van Kooten (2008), it would be
most straightforward to treat the project as a carbon sink when there
is sequestration and as a source when there is carbon reversal. If this
is not possible, oneway of comparing temporary and permanent credits
is to convert the associated duration of carbon sequestration into per-
manent abatement (McCarl and Schneider, 2000; Marland et al., 2001;
Dutschke, 2002; van Kooten, 2008). This is similar to the discounting
with respect to risk described in Section 2.1 of this paper, but now the
value is determined by the duration of the temporary credit and,
hence, carbon sequestration. The shorter the duration of the temporary
credit, the lower the value compared with a permanent credit. The con-
version rate is also related to forest growth and varies between 42 and
150 ton-years of temporary sequestration to cover 1 ton of permanent
reduction (e.g., Dutschke, 2002). van Kooten (2008) shows that the rel-
ative value of temporary storage increases with higher discount rate,
since the value of future permanent carbon sequestration is reduced.
On the other hand, the value decreases for a higher rate of atmospheric
damage.Table 1
Volume and price of forest carbon exchanges in 2012 and 2013.
Source: Goldstein et al. (2014).
Compliance and voluntary markets Volume, MtCO2e
2012
CDM/JI 0.5
California cap-and-trade 1.5
Australia CAPM CIF 2.9
New Zealand ETS 0.2
Others (RGGI, J-VER, T-VER) 0.6
Voluntary OTC (over the counter) 22.3
Total 28However, thepreferences for temporary versus permanent contracts
are likely to differ among sellers and buyers. Temporary credits are at-
tractive to sellers, since they give ﬂexibility on land use. Long-term
credits are more attractive to buyers, who look for safe and long-term
solutions. Both buyers and sellers can favor temporary credits because
of the avoidance of lock-in effects, since both can withdraw credits
and implement new technologies. Considering only sellers' opportunity
costs and buyers' costs of alternative carbon abatement, Olschewski et
al. (2005) calculate supply prices of temporary and permanent credits
which differ with respect to difference in duration and discount rate.
In an application to afforestation of pasture in north-western Patagonia,
they show that supply prices are well within the range of marginal
abatement costs for the potential buyers, which creates opportunities
for transactions. Similarly, Maréchal and Hecq (2006) show that the
equilibrium price of a temporary credit is negatively correlated with
the duration of a permanent credit. In a simulation of a hypothetical for-
est project, they show that the price of ﬁve-year credits is approximate-
ly one-third of the global average price of permanent credits (which last
for 20 years).
The studies on optimal policy design for ensuring permanence over
time consider soil carbon dynamics. Gulati and Vercammen (2005) ex-
amine determinants of optimal contract length for a one-time perfor-
mance payment. The duration is determined by the development of
net beneﬁts from alternative use of the land, which increases from
higher soil fertility created by larger carbon stocks, and the develop-
ment of carbon sequestration over time. The contract period declines
when the carbon sequestration rate is relatively high, since soil carbon
saturates relatively early and the marginal opportunity cost of land in-
creases because of the improved soil fertility. Feng et al. (2002) show
that carbon sequestration should be used as early as possible in the
planning period, since this reduces emissions abatement costs and al-
lows carbon emissions to ﬂow into a carbon sink. In aworld of no uncer-
tainty, they show how different incentive systems can achieve ﬁrst-best
outcome; sales of contracts with different contract periods to land-
owners, and sales of carbon offsets for sequestration but purchases of
credits for carbon releases.
3. Design of forest carbon exchange systems in practice
Forestry in carbon markets is a relatively new phenomenon, the
trading volume of which increased from 2.1 MtCO2e in 2005 to 32.7
MtCO2e in 2013CO2e (Goldstein et al., 2014). This covers approximately
0.5% of the carbon emissions subject to pricing instruments, including
both tax and cap-and-trade systems, in the world (Kossoy et al.,
2014). A vastmajority of the forest carbonwas exchanged under volun-
tary systems in both 2012 and 2013, see Table 1.
There was a slight increase in total trade in forest carbon between
2012 and 2013, which was due to the increase in voluntary forest car-
bon offsets. Exchange in two compliance markets, CDM and New
Zealand ETS, almost ceased in 2013. The CDM decline was a result of
the ending of the ﬁrst Kyoto commitment period. The reason for the de-
cline in New Zealand ETS was a government decision allowingAverage price, USD/ton CO2e
2013 2012 2013
0.04 1.1 6.0
1.7 8.2 9.4
1.5 13.3 20.8
7.9
0.4 25.3 9.8
29.0 7.6 4.8
32.8 7.8 5.2
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a large supply of cheap offsets from China and Russia (Goldstein et al.,
2014).
In 2013, forest carbon exchanges accounted for almost 50% of all vol-
untary carbon offsets, which also included investment in renewable en-
ergy (Goldstein et al., 2014). Most (85%) of the voluntary forest carbon
exchanges invested in REDDprojects. The allocation of carbon exchange
on the compliance markets was almost equally divided between the
Australia Carbon Pricing Mechanism and the California cap-and-trade
systems. In both systems, national forest carbon can be used as offset
by compliance ﬁrms. Another compliance system which allows for for-
est carbon offsets is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in
the US, which involves cooperation among 10 federal states for the pur-
pose of running a cap-and-trade system, the ﬁrst system of its kind in
the US (Streck et al., 2009).
The average prices on the compliance and voluntary markets differ,
USD 9.7/ton CO2e and USD 4.8/ton CO2e, respectively (2013 prices).
However, the prices also differ within the respective markets, between
USD 6.0 and 20.8/ton CO2e for compliance markets and between USD 1
and 100/ton CO2e for voluntary projects (Goldstein et al., 2014). The
range in prices on compliance markets may reﬂect the marginal cost
of carbon emissions reductions of other measures, which shows buyers'
willingness to pay for carbon offset. Buyers of offset on voluntary mar-
kets are mainly driven by cooperate social responsibility, and the varia-
tion in prices can be large. Approximately two-thirds of the total trade
volume is purchased by buyers in Europe and a majority of the sellers
are found in South America (55% of the total trade volume), followed
by Africa (17%) (Goldstein et al., 2014).
3.1. Heterogeneity, uncertainty and additionality
With respect to the analyses in the literature of uniform versus dif-
ferentiated carbon payments, the practice has been to use differentiated
payments with negotiations on carbon delivery and payments for each
project. Independent third-party standards have been applied on a pro-
ject-by-project basis on the forest carbonmarkets to ensure certain and
additional carbon sinks. The treatment of uncertainty with risk
discounting of forest carbon offset has been applied in a compliance
market, the New Zealand ETS. It was established in 2008 and originally
only comprised forest, where all forest owners had to participate (Jiang
et al., 2009). Two years later, all GHG emitting sectors were included.
The New Zealand Unit is comparable to the Kyoto Unit and can thus
be bought and sold not only on the New Zealand market, but also on
the internationalmarket. Risk discounting of forest carbon offsets corre-
sponding to 2:1 applies, i.e., 2 ton forest carbon are required to offset 1
ton CO2e emissions reduction (Kossoy et al., 2014).
Non-additionality is managed by means of independent standards,
which carry out additionality tests. The most common standard for vol-
untary projects is the Veriﬁed Carbon Standard (VCS), which accounted
for 46% of the transaction volume in 2013 (Goldstein et al., 2014). VCS
was set up in 2005 by non-government organizations including the Cli-
mate Group, the International Emissions Trading Association, The
World Economic Forum, and the Business Council for Sustainable Devel-
opment (Ascui and Neeff, 2013). The land management segment in-
cludes almost all types of projects; afforestation/reforestation (A/R),
REDD+, forest management, avoided conversion of grassland and
scrubland, and wetland restoration and conservation. Other indepen-
dent standards are the Gold Standard (GS), Plan Vivo, Climate Action
Reserve (CAR), and American Carbon Registry (ARC), which together
accounted for 3% of total forest carbon trade in 2013 (Goldstein et al.,
2014).
Australia's Carbon Pricing Mechanism uses Carbon Farming Initia-
tive (CFI) and California's cap-and-trade system applies the Compliance
Offset Protocol (COP), which account for 5% and 3%, respectively, of the
total forest carbon transactions (Goldstein et al., 2014). The Australian
CFI was established in 2011 and allows for forest sequestration as offsetfor compliance ﬁrms having to pay carbon taxes under Australia's Car-
bon Pricing Mechanism. From 2015, there is no limit on the maximum
amount of offsets, which include A/R, improved forest management
(IFM), and deforestation. The California cap-and-trade system started
in 2013 and forest carbon is one of four allowable offset types. Themax-
imum forest carbon offset,which includes A/R and IFM, is set at 8%of the
capped emissions, and it must follow California's COP.
Non-additionality can be mitigated not only by tests, but also by
upscaling baseline forest carbon, which reduces the ability of each pro-
ject owner to exercise information advantages on their true BAU level
(van Benthem and Kerr, 2013). The guidelines released in 2012 for de-
veloping VCS from project-based standard to jurisdictional and regional
levels, VCS JNR (jurisdictional and nested REDD), can be seen as a step
towards upscaling (Goldstein et al., 2014). In addition to upscaling of
baseline, the extended standard rests on payments by performance.
The state of Acre in Brazil, where deforestation has been extensive,
hosts a piloting project in this respectwhere the government aims at re-
ducing 12.5 million ton CO2e by 2020.
3.2. Permanence
In practice, two main approaches have been used for managing car-
bon reversal risks; buffer credits and distinction of temporary and per-
manent credits. The establishment of a buffer, for one or several
projects, means that part of the credits issued for a project are set
aside for future use in an eventual reversal. The project can claim back
the offsets in the pool if there is no carbon reversal. This system is
used by VCS, RGGI, California COP, and Australia CIF. The VCS standard
deduction is project-speciﬁc and ranges between 5% and 60%. In RGGI,
the deducted offsets, corresponding to 10% of total offsets, can be
waived if the landowner insures against natural carbon reversal. The
Australian CIF has a deduction of 5%, and the Californian COP assigns
project-based risk to assess the buffer requirement (Global Canopy
Programme, 2015a,b).
The system of separate temporary and permanent credits has been
appliedwithin the CDM framework and in theNew Zealand ETS. During
the 2008–2012 commitment period, the CDM allowed for carbon se-
questration as offset for temporary and long-term certiﬁed emissions
reduction (UNFCCC, 2003). New Zealand ETS initiated the Permanent
Forest Sink Initiative (PFSI) for ensuring long-term carbon conservation
(Belton, 2012). The PFSIwas designed tomeet the permanence problem
by settingminimumsustainable timber harvest during 99 years, liability
in case of carbon release, and permission to withdraw after 50 years
subject to replacement of carbon stock. The landowner is responsible
for carbon releases during the contract period, and insurance systems
have been developed to cover unintentional releases.
As discussed in the literature, the allocation of ﬁxed and perfor-
mance payments can be designed to give incentives to take due care
of the forest. This allocation of payments in practice is verymuch related
to type of forest activity. Themost common contract types for REDD and
IFM projects are performance payments either instantaneously when
offsets are issued, orwith payment on delivery for projects under devel-
opment (Goldstein et al., 2014). In contrast, contracts with ﬁxed pay-
ments account for the largest share (almost 75%) of A/R projects
because of the need to fund expenses for tree plantation.
4. Discussion
Comparing the main ﬁndings in the literature as reported in Section
2 and the common design principles of actual forest carbon sink instru-
ments presented in Section 3 reveals several similarities, but also some
differences, Table 2.
With respect to uncertainty and the cost of uniform compared with
differentiated carbon payments, the practice has been to issue offsets on
a project-by-project basis and apply approved standards for monitoring
and veriﬁcation. Payments and carbon delivery are then differentiated
Table 2
Comparison of main ﬁndings in the literature and design characteristics in practice with
respect to heterogeneity and uncertainty, additionality, and permanence in forest carbon
sequestration.
Main ﬁndings in the literature Main design features in practice
Heterogeneity
and
uncertainty
Uniform price of carbon sink
per unit (forest area or
management practice) can
create high or low costs of
inefﬁciency, depending on
variability in carbon
sequestration per unit.
Project-based offset and
payment with standards for
monitoring and veriﬁcation
Treatment of uncertainty as a
risk discount increases the
carbon sink enhancement cost.
Risk discounting (New Zealand
ETS)
Additionality Optimal contract design for
additional sink by paying rent
to the agent for their
information advantage to make
them reveal the true type
Additionality tests on a project
basis (VCS, California's
Compliance Protocol. Australia's
Carbon Farmer Initiative)
In a two-sector system, with
ﬁrms in compliance and carbon
sinks as offsets, higher
stringency in the carbon
project's baseline emissions can
foster additionality. Risk
discount of offset reduces
efﬁciency.
Upscaling of BAU baseline from
individual projects to
jurisdictions (VCS JNR)
Permanence Liability on sellers Temporary and permanent
credits (CDM, New Zealand)
Optimal contract design with
low base payment and high
performance payment, or the
opposite if uncertainty in
landowner income is included
Buffer credits (VCS, California's
Compliance Offset Protocol,
Australia's Carbon Farmer
Initiative)
Temporary credits
Discounting
Mainly performance payments
for REDD+ and IFM, but ﬁxed
payments for A/R
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a uniform system. On the other hand, the differentiation is associated
with transaction costs. The cost of monitoring and veriﬁcation can
vary between 3% and 10% of the carbon prices for forest projects in the
US (Mooney et al., 2004; Kile, 2009). Extended scope of transaction
costs (including cost of project development andmanagement) are pre-
sented byMilner (1999), who shows that the transaction costs of forest
carbon projects located in Latin America, Asia, and the Russian Federa-
tion range between 6% and 45% of total cost. According to Galik et al.
(2012), similar types of transaction costs for improved carbon forest
management in the US amount on average to 25% of the total cost.
Risk discounting as a means of reducing the value of a forest carbon
offset because of uncertainty has been applied under the New Zealand
ETS. Concerning additionality, tests by approved standards have been
applied in practice. Contract design for information asymmetry on car-
bon sequestration costs, as suggested in the literature, seems to be ab-
sent in practice. On the other hand, recent adjustments in standards
(VCS) to move from project-based offsets to political jurisdiction ﬁnd
support in the literature as a means of mitigating problems with non-
additionality. Contract design for mitigating non-permanence has
been suggested in the literature and also implemented in practice, but
not for forest activities with high upfront investment such as A/R. In
practice, the risk of carbon reversal has beenmanaged bymeans of buff-
er credits in most standards.
However, there can be differences between the intended effect of
the design system in practice and actual outcome with respect to forest
carbon exchange, which is determined by both buyers' and sellers' in-
centives. Both the literature and system design in practice focus on un-
certainty in carbon delivery mainly from the buyer's perspective, but
some studies show that the seller's risk may be prohibitive for signing
a contract. Sellers' uncertainty is mainly associatedwith weak public in-
stitutions in developing countries (Jindal et al., 2008; Gong et al., 2010;Mbatu, 2015) or with carbon price risks (Manley and Maclaren, 2012;
Kerchner and Keeton, 2015).
Jindal et al. (2008) survey 23 REDD projects in Tanzania, Kenya, and
Uganda, which differ with respect to project size, beneﬁt sharing with
the community, potential carbon sequestration, and forest activity (for-
est conservation, IFM, A/R). They show that seemingly promising pro-
jects with respect to carbon sequestration and income provision to the
local communities are constrained by insecure land tenure. Similar re-
sults are reported by Gong et al. (2010), who investigated why so few
areas are reforested under a CDM project in China, the ﬁrst of its kind.
They found that, in addition to the uncertainty associated with carbon
sequestration as such, farmers face risks with vaguely deﬁned property
rights, uncertain government policies, and carbonmarket prices. Mbatu
(2015) shows that the government signing other agreements, such as
the Convention on Biological Diversity and Forest Principles, may have
helped implementation of REDD in Cameroon.
The problem with insecure property rights can also be an impedi-
ment to promising carbon projects in other countries, since it has been
found that relatively much of the REDD funding is distributed to coun-
tries with weak enforcement institutions (Ebeling and Yasué, 2008;
Kronenberg et al., 2015). This ﬁnding supports the hypotheses of ‘eco-
system service curse’ and ‘REDD+ paradox’, where the recipient coun-
tries face more problems as a result of the payments. The reason is that,
even if deforestation decreases and forest management improves, pay-
ments may foster corrupt government agencies who may receive most
or all beneﬁts that are not shared with the rural populations, and there-
by give no or little incentive for conservation initiatives.
The role of price risks in compliance markets as an impediment to
landowners entering a contract is highlighted by Manley and
Maclaren (2012), who evaluated the effect on forest management of
the New Zealand emissions trading system, according to which forest
owners receive units for increases in carbon stocks of their plantations.
They point out the need for risk reduction measures, such as a hedging
policymitigating carbon price risks. Kerchner and Keeton (2015) inves-
tigated theﬁnancial viability of family landowner projects in California's
Air Resource Board. They found that carbon stocking and size of the
property were the main determinants of return for the forest owners,
but also that uncertainty in carbon prices reduces the expected proﬁts.
Whether or not uncertainties in a buyer's perspective affect actual
prices on carbon offsets is analyzed by Conte and Kotchen (2010) in
an econometric analysis of a hedonic model of carbon offset prices on
the voluntary markets. Based on project data from the Carbon Catalog
(CC), they were able to regress prices of offsets on different attributes;
type of offset (wind, solar, forestry carbon, etc.), developed, developing,
and least developed country, CDM, Gold Standard (GS), or VCS veriﬁca-
tion. They found that a forestry carbon project reduces the carbon price,
that VCS veriﬁcation also reduces it, and that CDM and GS increases it.
This can be explained by the fact that certiﬁcation of the two latter qual-
iﬁes for emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. Further analysis
by Conte and Kotchen (2010) of the determination of only forestry car-
bon prices, which amount to 40% of all projects included, showed that
forestry projects in developing and least developed countries are sub-
ject to substantial price reductions, up to 70%, which may reﬂect the
particular uncertainty associated with weak enforcement institutions
in these countries.
5. Conclusions
This study reviewed the economics literature on efﬁcient policy de-
sign for promoting forest carbon sequestration and compared the rec-
ommendations with policy design in practice. The speciﬁc difﬁculties
associated with policy design for carbon sequestration are associated
with the site-speciﬁc sequestration conditions, uncertainty in seques-
tration, additionality, and permanence. The literature calculates and
compares the costs of uniform and differentiated carbon schemes, but
the practice to date has been to use a differentiated system where
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additionality for each project. Most studies show relatively small differ-
ences in costs, i.e., efﬁciency losses, of a second-best policy, e.g., a system
with uniform payments per area of land or management practice. How-
ever, transaction costs, for REDD projects in particular, are considerable
and can amount to 25% of the total cost.
In principle, the literature describes two approaches for manage-
ment of additionality and permanence. One is to accept the magnitude
of non-additionality and non-permanence and design policy instru-
ments accounting for the deﬁciencies, an approach applied in particular
for design of forest carbon as offset on compliancemarkets, such as cap-
and-trade systems. One ton of carbon sequestration is then compared
with a certain permanent emissions reduction and a discount or price
ratio that depends on the magnitude of uncertainty, non-additionality,
or non-permanence in carbon sequestration is established. This ap-
proach is used in the New Zealand ETS. Another instrument employed
within this approach in practice by several standards and carbon pricing
systems is the use of buffer credits as insurance against carbon reversals
during the contract period. The other approach is to ﬁnd policy instru-
ments for mitigating the magnitude of non-additionality and non-per-
manence, on a project-by-project basis, by creating incentive-
compatible contracts. Non-additionality for carbon offsets on compli-
ance markets can also be mitigated by setting baselines for projects to
a larger scale. Neither suggestion has been implemented in practice,
but the recent extension of VCS to jurisdictional level, which includes
several projects, represents a move in this direction. The role of im-
proved systems formonitoring and veriﬁcation for reducing uncertainty
and non-additionality in carbon sequestration is not analyzed in the lit-
erature on policy design for forest carbon sequestration, but has proven
efﬁcient for carbon offsets elsewhere. Interdependence of above-ground
and below-ground carbon pools complicates measurement and moni-
toring of carbon sequestration, but no study addresses policy design
for this interdependency.
One impediment to introduction of forest carbon offset projects, in
particular REDD+ projects, is weak institutions and insecure property
rights. Design of contracts creating incentives for self-enforcement can
be of more practical relevance in the future, in particular since many
of the low-cost options for carbon offsets exist in the developing coun-
tries. Voluntary funding for REDD+ projects is already large, 88% of
total forest carbon trade volume in 2013, and the market for these pro-
jects may be saturated. (Goldstein et al., 2014). However, the demand
for carbon offsets on compliance markets is expected to increase
when recently introduced compliance markets, such as the California
cap-and-trade, become established and new markets emerge, such as
theHubei and Chongqingmarkets in China and the tax and trade system
in South Africa. Insights from the literature on the importance of speci-
fying baseline sequestration, without the project in question, for miti-
gating efﬁciency losses from non-additionality can then be useful.
Furthermore, demand for methods developed in the literature for com-
paring efﬁciency losses from uniform and differentiated payments may
arise when nesting and scaling up projects to jurisdictional level.Acknowledgements
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